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PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE MAGIC IN THE LAW OF
LAND TRUSTS AND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
A HAPPY PRESENT AND A TROUBLED FUTURE
FEDERICO CHEEVER*
I. INTRODUCION
In October 1995, I joined about a thousand other people-predominately
young and professional, in shorts and pile jackets-in an ornate auditorium on
the California coast.' We listened politely as politicians-aging, in suits and
ties, identifying themselves with "the radical middle"-praised the
achievements of the "land trust movement." The numbers, enthusiasm, and
experience of my companions provided much better evidence of the achieve-
ments of that movement than the politicians could. It is, currently, the most
active and forward-looking element in the national effort for environmental
preservation. The laws that provide the framework for the national environ-
mental regulatory structure remain in a perilous and apparently perpetual
reauthorization holding pattern in Congress.2 State legislatures appear unwill-
ing to undertake environmental protection where the federal government no
longer will. But someone establishes a new "private" land trust, committed to
scenic, historic, or ecological preservation on an average of once a week.3
The land trust movement furthers the public good4 in ways that other
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., M.A., Stanford
University, 1981; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, 1986. Copyright
Federico Cheever, 1996. I would like to thank the organizers and participants in the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review Symposium on the New Private Law, particularly Sue Chrisman and Tracy
Craige, without whom this essay would have been impossible, my three able research assistants
Timothy Gordon, Dirk Holt, and Greg Johnson, William Silberstein and his colleagues at Isaacson,
Rosenbaum & Levy, P.C. (Colorado's preeminent land tust lawyers), Jake Barnes, Alan Chen,
Roberto Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, Cecilia Espenoza, Julie Nice, Rob Smith,
Celia Taylor, Richard Collins, Daniel Farber, Clayton Gillette, Gary Peller, Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Annette Stroud, the participants in my environmental law seminar in the fall of 1995,
many, many others, and of course, Mary McNeil Cheever and Elizabeth Oakley Cheever.
I. Land Trust Alliance National Rally '95, Asilomar Conference Center, Pacific Grove
California, Oct. 15-18, 1995.
2. 25 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10104 (discussing Congress's attempt to reauthorize
the Endangered Species Act); 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10089 (discussing Congress's
failure to reauthorize the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 24 ENVrTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10262 (discussing Congress's attempt to reauthorize CERCLA); 24 ENVrTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10489 (discussing Congress's failure to reauthorize the Clean Water Act).
3. LAND TRUST ALUANCE, 1995 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LAND TRUSTS at vi (1995)
[hereinafter DIRECTORY] (Land Trust Alliance 1994 Land Trust Survey results).
4. For purposes of this essay, I assume that piecemeal preservation of open space by private
transaction is in the public interest. Some reviewers of this essay questioned the public value of
land trusts because the land trust preservation model does not require comprehensive planning. In
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more "public" aspects of the environmental protection movement cannot be-
cause it possesses a "private magic." I use the word "magic" for its two mean-
ings: "the art of producing illusions.., by the use of sleight of hand" and
"the art of producing a desired effect or result through... techniques that pre-
sumably assure human control over supernatural agencies. ' I leave to the
reader whether the "private magic" of land trusts and conservation easements
is simply legal sleight of hand or the "operation of some occult controlling
principle of nature."
The magic of the land trust movement has something to do with its appar-
ent contradictions. The movement is "radical" because it regularly endeavors
to do what traditional environmental protection rarely dares to do--"lock-up"
private land. Through donation and purchase, land trusts transform the proper-
ty rights associated with the land they protect, prohibiting or severely limiting,
in perpetuity, the possibility of environmentally damaging development. Many
of my companions in California had experience in more traditional and "pub-
lic" elements of the environmental movement. In land trusts and conservation
easements, they have found powerful tools to pursue goals they have pursued
before in other ways. At the same time, the movement achieves its goals pri-
marily through private, voluntary land transactions, among the most ancient
and settled of all means of legal interaction and among the least "public" or
controversial. This draws to its ranks activists distrustful of government,' and
politicians fond of words like "middle."
At present, the land trust movement seems a successful combination of
public and private. Its apparent success provides a useful model for achieving
legislated goals in a privatized world. However, some dark omens cloud the
future of the movement and, absent some changes in the legal structures that
support it, time may erode the happy congruity between public and private at
the cost of the environment and the public good. The legal community associ-
ated with the land trust movement should address these potential problems.
However, in doing so, we must be careful to avoid destroying the private
magic that gives the movement its special power.
Land trusts do many things: they purchase land outright; they purchase
land for sale to government agencies; they participate in the development and
application of every conceivable manner of land use restriction, public or pri-
vate. I will focus my attention on one specific type of transaction which, I
believe, embodies more than any other the movement's happy present and
potentially troubled future: acquisition and maintenance of conservation ease-
ments by private land trusts. First, I will describe some general legal aspects
fact, land trust land purchases can compliment comprehensive land use planning. The Internal
Revenue Code governing the income tax deductibility of donations to land trusts require that "the
preservation of open space be pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, state or local governmental
conservation policy." I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii) (1994). The regulations interpreting that provision
explicitly govern designations of scenic areas. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (1994).
5. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1155 (2d ed. 1983).
6. 6 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 24 (1933).
7. Telephone Interview with Reeves Brown, Colorado Cattleman's Land Trust (May 24,
1996).
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of both conservation easements and the land trusts which employ them.' I will
then use a single hypothetical conservation easement transaction to demon-
strate the complex and productive interrelationship between public goals and
private.9 I will use the same hypothetical transaction to identify some of the
dangers the future may hold." Finally, I will ponder briefly possible respons-
es to these dangers and how they might affect the private magic of the land
trust movement."
I should say, at the outset, that I do not believe that the legal problems the
future holds for land trusts are insurmountable. My companions in California
are not wasting their time. However, the positive politics of the movement
serve to obscure problems, which, if left unaddressed, may lead to dire results.
Those who have ruminated about the legal ramifications of the land trust
movement in the past have been concerned about the movement's place in the
law of property, 2 the tax benefits it can provide, 3 and its potential positive
effects on American farmers. 4 I am an environmental lawyer concerned
about biological diversity. I want land trusts and conservation easements to
function and to preserve environmental values for "biologically significant"'5
periods of time. Perversely, this may make my characterizations of the prob-
lems they face more alarming than others have been.
II. THE LAND TRUST/CONSERVATION EASEMENT BOOM
A. What Is a Conservation Easement?
The land trusts represented at the California conference sometimes pre-
serve land by buying it or receiving it as a donation, transforming property
relations only by transferring the "bundle of rights" we understand as land
ownership 6 into the hands of an organization committed to biological or aes-
thetic preservation." However, their favored tool is not acquisition of the fee,
but instead, the "conservation easement."
By granting a conservation easement, the owner of land splits that bundle
of rights, reserving the rights to engage in certain activities (for example:
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part 11.
10. See infra Part IV.
1I. See infra Part V.
12. See, e.g., Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common
Law, 8 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 2 (1989); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433
(1984).
13. See, e.g., Mathew J. Keifer, Creating Additional Tax Benefits from Qualified Conserva-
tion Easements, 15 REAL EST. LJ. 136 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Vivian Quinn, Preserving Farmland with Conservation Easements: Public Ben-
efit or Burden?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 235 (1994).
15. See generally KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLI-
TICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
16. For an excellent and recent treatment of this concept, see J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bun-
dle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994).
17. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
19961 1079
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
hunting, farming, building a cabin) to the grantor-holder of the underlying
possessory interest-and ceding the right to prevent the grantor or anyone else
from engaging in another range of activities (for example: building casinos,
housing developments, clearcutting timber, or filling swamps) to another party,
the grantee. A conservation easement may prohibit all ground disturbing activ-
ity on a piece of wild land or prohibit only activities that will interfere with
particular things (e.g., elk calving). Conservation easements may preserve land
as farmland or preserve a "working forest" by allowing only certain types and
a certain frequency of logging. The terms of the restrictions are usually set out
in detail in the conservation easement itself.'"
1. Not an Easement at All
Conservation easements are statutory creations. They do not fit easily into
any common law category for real property interests. They are creatures of
legislation and recent legislation at that. The Colorado Conservation Easement
Statute was adopted in 1976, "' five years before the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the current Uniform Conser-
vation Easement Act. Although almost all states now have some form of con-
servation easement or restriction legislation, the oldest identifiable "conser-
vation easement" statutes were adopted in Massachusetts in 19560 and Cali-
fomia in 1959.2" Significantly, both statutes originally only authorized gov-
ernment entities to hold the created interests.2 Modem conservation easement
statutes allow private land trusts and other organizations to hold the ease-
ments. 3
A conservation easement is not an "easement" in the traditional sense.24
Before the statutory coming of conservation easements, the common law sys-
tem of servitudes tolerated both negative easements and easements in gross,
but under limited circumstances.' These circumstances did not include what
18. The Land Trust Alliance Model Conservation Easement uses a tripartite structure identi-
fying overarching "conservation values" the easement should protect, specific reserved rights iden-
tifying what activities the holder of the underlying fee interest may engage in, and specific "pro-
hibited uses" identifying activities that the fee holder may not engage in. JANET DmHL & THOMAS
BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 147-65 (1988). Iowa requires that the con-
servation easement "clearly state its extent and purpose." IOWA CODE § 457A.4 (1993).
19. Act approved May 13, 1976, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 750-752 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -111 (1994)); see Comment, Open Space Procurement Un-
der Colorado's Scenic Easement Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 383 (1989).
20. 1956 Mass. Acts, ch. 631; see Comment, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic
Easements and Greenbelt Zoning, 12 STAN. L. REV. 638, 642 (1960) [hereinafter Preservation].
21. The Scenic Easement Deed Act of 1959, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (1959). Some
argue that California passed the first open space easement legislation in the United States. THOM-
AS S. BARRETT & PuTNAM LIVERMORE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 34
(1983).
22. See Preservation, supra note 20, at 638.
23. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
24. Korngold, supra note 12, at 477-78.
25. The common law preferred neither easements in gross nor negative easements. See Weil
v. Hill, 69 So. 438, 440 (Ala. 1915) ("[T]he court will not presume that [the easement] was in-
tended to be in gross, or personal to the grantor, if it can fairly be construed as appurtenant to his
land ...."); Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 101 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Cal. 1940) ("[Alny pro-
visions of an instrument creating or claimed to create [a negative easement] will be strictly con-
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we now call conservation easements. Traditionally, negative easements in the
United States were limited to easements for light, air, support, or the flow of
artificial streams.26 A negative easement protected the interests of one proper-
ty owner by restricting the owner of nearby property from exercising an other-
wise valid property right. 7 On the other hand, by definition, an easement in
gross creates a personal right in an individual, a right unassociated with own-
ership of land.28 Easements in gross were generally restricted to commercial
affirmative functions like the right to erect billboards or to maintain sewer
lines and railway corridors.29 Negative easements were by their nature appur-
tenant. 30 Easements in gross were by their nature affirmative. Negative ease-
ments in gross were beyond the contemplation of the traditional easement
categories.3
strued, any doubt being resolved in favor of the free use of the land."); Atlantic Mills v. New
York Cent. R. Co., 223 N.Y.S. 206, 211 (App. Div. 1927) ("It is a well-established principle of
law that an easement in gross will not be presumed, where it can fairly be construed to be appur-
tenant to land."); McWhorter v. City of Jacksonville, 694 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
("It is the rule that an easement in gross is not favored, and an easement is never presumed to be
in gross, or a personal right, when it can be fairly construed to be appurtenant or attached to some
other estate."); Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Constr. & Dry Dock Co., 173 P. 508, 511
(Wash. 1918) ("It is well settled in law that easements in gross are not favored; and a very strong
presumption exists in favor of construing easements as appurtenant.").
26. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 851 (3d ed. 1993).
27. Clements v. Taylor, 184 S.W.2d 485, 487-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1944). Accord Uihlein v.
Matthews, 64 N.E. 792, 793 (N.Y. 1902).
28. See Ratino v. Hart, 424 S.E.2d 753, 756 (W.Va. 1992) ("An easement in gross is not
appurtenant to any estate in land or does not belong to any person by virtue of ownership of estate
in other land but is mere personal interest in or right to use land of another, it is purely person-
al ...."); see also Stiefel v. Lindermann, 638 A.2d 642, 647 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) ("An
easement in gross belongs to the owner of it apart from his ownership or possession of any specif-
ic land and, in contrast to an easement appurtenant, its ownership is personal to its owners.").
29. Alan D. Hegi, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability and Divisibility Since
1945, 39 VAND. L. REV. 109 (1986); Korngold, supra note 12.
30. See Miller v. Babb, 263 S.W. 253, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
31. The comments accompanying the Uniform Conservation Easement Act contain a justifi-
cation for the use of the term "conservation easement":
The interests protected by the Act are termed "easements." The terminology reflects a
rejection of two alternatives suggested in existing state acts dealing with non-possessory
conservation and preservation interests. The first removes the common law disabilities
associated with covenants, real and equitable servitudes in addition to those associated
with easements.... The second approach seeks to create a novel additional interest
which, although unknown to the common law, is, in some ill-defined sense, a statutorily
modified amalgam of the three traditional common law interests.
The easement alternative is favored in the Act for three reasons. First, lawyers
and courts are most comfortable with easements and easement doctrine, less so with
restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes, and can be expected to experience severe
confusion if the Act opts for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic
less-than-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant and the equitable servitude
appeared only because of then-current, but now outdated, limitations of easement doc-
trine.
UNIF. CONSERv. EASEMENT AcT § I cmt. (1981). While defensible in practical terms, this justi-
fication does not make much doctrinal sense. In an era in which the majority of newly constructed
housing is subject to restrictive covenants, it is hard to assert that "an easement is the basic [one
size fits all] less-than-fee interest." A conservation easement is in fact the "novel additional inter-
est" which the drafters of the Uniform law fear will create "severe confusion." See Komgold,
supra note 12, at 439.
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2. Use Restrictions on a Land Use Restriction
State conservation easement statutes generally limit the purposes for
which such novel interests may be created. The Uniform Conservation Ease-
ment Act, approved in 1981 and adopted in sixteen states32 and the District of
Columbia,33 provides an example in its definition of "conservation easement":
A nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limita-
tions or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retain-
ing or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real proper-
ty, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.34
The "purposes of which include" phrasing in the Uniform Act is a rela-
tively modest restriction on the intent of the parties at the time of the transac-
tion. California law provides that a "'conservation easement' means any limi-
tation in a deed, will or other instrument in the form of an easement... bind-
ing upon successive owners ... the purpose of which is to retain land pre-
dominantly in its natural, scenic, historic, agricultural, forested, or open space
condition."35 The laws of Delaware, Hawaii, and New York contain similar
unqualified "purpose" requirements. 6 On the other hand, the laws of Colora-
do, Massachusetts, and New Jersey require only that the restriction be "appro-
priate" for maintaining a legislative purpose."
In addition to purpose restrictions, some states list specific acts that the
grantor may prohibit. Delaware not only enumerates what may be prohibit-
ed, it specifically provides what may not be prohibited: the easement cannot
prohibit the fee holder from allowing hunting, fishing, or other recreational
activities on the land.39 The Kentucky statute includes language forbidding
certain restrictions affecting mining operations.'
32. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.17.010-.060 (1989); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-271 to -276
(1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to -8 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2101 to -2109
(1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-2.6-1 to -7 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3810 to -3817
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382.800-.860 (Baldwin 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§
476 to 479-B (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84C.01-.05 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
89-19-1 to -15 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.390-.400 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-12-1 to
-6 (Michie 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 183.001-.005 (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. 1950, §§ 10.1-1009 to -1016 (Michie 1988);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West 1981).
33. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2601 to -2605 (1986).
34. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT Acr § l(l) (1981) (emphasis added).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (1988) (emphasis added).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(a) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 198-1 (1989); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303(1) (McKinney 1989).
37. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (West 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184, § 31 (1995); NJ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-2(b) (West 1991).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(a) (1991) (providing a non-exclusive list). Accord FLA.
STAT. ch. 704.06 (1988) (providing an exclusive list); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1995) (pro-
viding an exclusive list).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6901(c).
40. Specifically, the Kentucky statute prohibits the transfer of a conservation easement on
property in which there are outstanding subsurface rights, unless written consent is acquired from
1082 [Vol. 73:4
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To take advantage of federal legislation allowing a charitable income tax
deduction for "qualified conservation contributions,"' discussed below,42
most conservation easements are created "in perpetuity." Some states require
perpetual conservation easements. 3 Most state conservation easement statutes
provide that conservation easements are to be unlimited in duration unless
otherwise stated in the instrument itself.' Kansas, on the other hand, requires
that a conservation easement be limited to the lifetime of the grantor unless
otherwise stated in the conservation easement.45 Many statutes specifically
provide that conservation easements can be released or modified like any other
easement. 6
B. What Is a Land Trust?
A land trust is either a governmental entity or a private non-profit corpo-
ration, association, or trust committed to biological, historical, or aesthetic
preservation. Not all private land trusts hold conservation easements, but most
the owners of the subsurface rights first. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.850(1) (Baldwin 1988).
Furthermore, the easement cannot interfere with coal mining operations on adjacent or surrounding
properties. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.850(2).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994).
42. See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
43. California and Hawaii both require that conservation easements be perpetual. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 198-2(b).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.010(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-272(C); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 15-20-406 (Michie 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3); IDAHO CODE § 55-
2102(3); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.002(c).
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d). Apparently, the only way Kansans could get a conserva-
tion easement bill passed was to include this concession supported by various interests groups.
However, Kansas Land Trust, the lone listed land trust operating in Kansas, will only accept con-
servation easements if they are perpetual. Telephone Interview with Joyce A. Wolf, Executive
Director, Kansas Land Trust (Apr. 19, 1996).
46. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-404; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-3(a); IDAHO CODE §
55-2102(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-5.6-2(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(b); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 477(1); MINN. STAT. § 84C.02(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.420(1); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 47-12-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-8-30; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-57; TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 183.002(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1014; W. VA. CODE § 20-12-4(a) (1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(2). In addition to release, Colorado allows a conservation easement to
be terminated, extinguished, or abandoned by merger with the fee interest. COLO. REv. STAT. §
38-30.5-107. In Iowa, a conservation easement may be released by the holder or changed circum-
stances can render an easement no longer beneficial to the public. IOWA CODE § 457A.2(l)
(1996). In Kansas, the grantor is permitted to have the easement revoked at her request. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d). In Maine, a change in circumstances may justify a termination of the
conservation easement. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477(3)(B). Montana allows open-space
land to be converted under certain circumstances, but requires that it be replaced with other prop-
erty.*MoNr. CODE ANN. § 76-6-107 (1995). Nebraska allows release of a conservation easement
with the approval of the governing body that originally approved the conservation easement. NEaB.
REV. STAT. § 76-2,113 (1990). In New Jersey, the holder may release a conservation easement, if
allowed by the terms of the easement, only after a public hearing. NJ. REV. STAT. § 13:8B-5.
New York allows conservation easements to be released if allowed by the instrument creating the
easement and extinguished if a court finds it to be of no actual benefit to the person seeking en-
forcement. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 49-0307 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS.
LAW § 1951. In Rhode Island, a holder may release a conservation easement subject to the terms
of the easement itself. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-5 (1995). Utah also allows for termination by re-
lease, abandonment, merger, nonrenewal, specific conditions set out in the easement, or any other
lawful manner. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-5 (1994). Mississippi, on the other hand, specifies that
merger does not occur if the fee holder is also the easement holder. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-19-5.
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do.4' Accordingly, most private land trusts must conform to the requirements
for easement holders imposed by the conservation easement statutes in the
states in which they operate. Two sets of legal rules, one state and one federal,
define the characteristics to which private land trusts conform.
First, state conservation easement statutes, discussed above, generally
allow only two types of entities to hold development rights for someone else's
land for purposes of preservation. Again, the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act provides an example:
(2) "Holder" [of a Conservation Easement] means:
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real proper-
ty under the laws of this State or the United States; or
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable
trust, the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting
the natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property. . .
The states that have adopted versions of this uniform law all contain some
similar limitation on potential private "holders" of conservation easements.
Alaska and Virginia explicitly require that private "holders" be non-profit
entities for purposes of federal taxation.49
California, although not a Uniform Act state, places similar limitations on
potential easement holders." Colorado, also not a Uniform Act state, requires
"a charitable organization" exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the "Internal
Revenue Code of 1954."'" Massachusetts is more restrictive still, requiring
the purposes of the "charitable corporation or trust" to conform with the spe-
cific purposes of the type of restriction: conservation, agricultural preservation,
watershed preservation, or affordable housing. 2
Federal regulations provide the remaining characteristics of private land
trusts. Because much of the grantors' impetus for land trust preservation
comes from the charitable federal income tax deductions allowed for "quali-
fied conservation contributions" to "qualified organizations," '53 private land
trusts must generally be "qualified organizations." Internal Revenue Service
Code § 170(h)(3) defines qualified organizations to include most § 501(c)(3)
charitable organizations that receive substantial public support and almost any
governmental entity.54 Private land trusts must satisfy the requirements for
private "qualified" organizations. Establishing necessary tax-exempt status re-
quires some specific structure, filing, and reporting.55 To maintain tax-exempt
47. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vii (1995) (Land Trust Alliance 1994 survey indicated that
54% of land trusts use donated conservation easements and 13% purchase easements).
48. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 1(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 34.17.060(2)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1009.
50. CAL. CIv. CODE § 815.3(a),
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(2).
52. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184 § 31-32.
53. I.R.C. § 170(h) (1995).
54. I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (1995). The regulations interpreting this provision also require that a
"qualified organization" have "a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the donation
and have the resources to enforce the restriction." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (1994).
55. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, THE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES GUIDEBOOK, AN OPERATING
MANUAL FOR LAND TRUSTS, Standard 4.
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status, private land trusts must avoid any action which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, avoid political campaign activity, not en-
gage in "substantial" lobbying, and meet the "public support test" (which
requires that a substantial part of the organization's support comes from the
general public).56
While significant, these two sets of rules do not dictate the specific char-
acter of individual private land trusts. Land trusts range in size from the rela-
tively vast Nature Conservancy57 and Trust for Public Lands,5" to extremely
small organizations with minimal budgets and no paid staff. Land trusts may
operate on a national scale or be entirely local. They may endeavor to protect
a range of land types and uses, or they may be interest-specific, like the Colo-
rado Cattlemen's Agricultural Land Trust.
Private land trusts are older than conservation easements, but not much
older. Founded in 1891, Massachusetts' Trustees of Reservations is probably
the oldest private land trust in the United States.59 Before 1950 there were
less than forty land trusts in the United States.' There are now 1,095 private
land trusts in the country.6
C. The Boom
1. Advantages of Land Trust/Conservation Easement Preservation
The enthusiasm for the land trust movement extends beyond the politi-
cians at the California conference. With the exception of a few dissenting
voices,' it is almost universal. Environmental preservation by land trust of-
fers significant advantages over environmental protection through direct public
regulation.
First, environmental preservation by land trusts encourages the creation of
a more site-specific environmental protection regime. While regulation lends
itself to categorical protection of all wetlands (however defined) from all
56. Id. at 4-8, 4-9.
57. The Nature Conservancy has offices in every state and some foreign countries. For a
map of locations, see http://www:tnc.orglinfield/map.html.
58. Twenty-two offices at last count; see http://www.igc.apc.orgtpl.
59. Randee G. Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method of Preserving Open Space, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1042 (1980).
60. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 5.
61. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vi.
62. Some critics charge that larger land trusts, such as The Nature Conservancy, "exist to
remove land or land fights from the ordinary marketplace." Tom Holt, Q: Are Nonprofit Land
Trusts Taking Advantage of the Public's Trust?, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 22. Taking land
from the marketplace "removes the land from local tax roles and limits job growth." Malcolm
Howard, U.S.-Environment: Land Trusts Protect, Threaten Country Lifestyles, Inter Press Service,
Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Current file. Groups such as The Nature
Conservancy are also able to stop larger housing and industrial development by acquiring develop-
ment rights in strategic areas. Holt, supra, at 22. Property rights advocates also criticize The Na-
ture Conservancy for buying land or land rights and immediately selling them to government
agencies for a profit. Aside from being labeled as "profit-motivated," The Nature Conservancy is
also chastised for avoiding accountability. Id. The stated purpose for this practice is that the gov-
ernment cannot operate as freely as a land trust can, so the government uses the land trust as a
"middleman." Id.
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significant disturbance (however defined), conservation easements and land
trust acquisition lend themselves to protection of particular wetlands with
particular boundaries in particular places. Because every wetland-like every
other piece of land-is different, a more site-specific regulatory regime can, in
theory, do a better job of protection.
Second, and more intriguing, for a law professor at least, is the capacity
of conservation easements to alter the nature of land tenure itself. During the
1970s and 1980s, protection of the environment affected the nature of land
tenure through public regulation. The rights associated with uses of land re-
mained conceptually unchanged, but were increasingly subject to "burdens"
imposed by local, state, and federal regulation for environmental protection. A
land owner remained sole owner of her land, but could not fill wetlands upon
the land, destroy endangered species' nesting habitat, emit large quantities of
noxious air pollutants, or build more than a certain number of houses per acre.
The various elements of this process of land regulation have been discussed at
length elsewhere.
The conceptual structure of burdensome regulation upon property rights
has contributed to the current backlash against environmental protection be-
cause it fosters a sense of injury among landowners. Accustomed to our con-
ceptual structure of legal rights, they perceive that they have "rights" that they
cannot exercise.
Conservation easements avoid this by creating property rights in conserva-
tion. The holders of conservation easements possess, to a greater or lesser
degree, the right to prevent development on the land subject to the easement.
They may prevent, just as a regulator might, such environmentally harmful
activities as: the filling of wetlands, destruction of species' nesting habitat,
construction of factories that might emit noxious air pollutants, and construc-
tion of additional structures. Legally, however, we do not perceive this protec-
tion as an imposition but rather an exercise of rights. The fee holder does not
have rights she cannot exercise; those rights have been granted away with the
conservation easement.
Property... includes a normative "deep structure" that may be of
use in an environmental ethic. The norms that lurk in property go
beyond the wonderous power of exclusion that so awed Blackstone in
the case of individual property. They include as well the qualities of
restraint and responsibility that characterize common or shared prop-
erty.
63
The express mutual interests in the same land created by severing the rights
associated with a conservation easement from the rights associated with the
underlying possessory interest crystalize these often hidden norms of responsi-
bility and restraint in our property system.
63. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics,
24 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (1994).
1086 [Vol. 73:4
PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE MAGIC
2. Growth in Land Trust/Conservation Easement Preservation
According to a 1994 survey conducted by the Land Trust Alliance (LTA),
there are now more than 1,095 private land trusts in the United States, an
increase of 23% over four years.'4 These trusts have protected roughly
4,029,000 acres of land. Of that acreage, 990,000 acres were acquired and
then transferred to a third party (generally a government agency), 535,000
acres are owned outright by land trusts, and 740,000 acres are protected by
conservation easements held by land trusts. The rest of the four million acres
are protected in ways unidentified by the LTA survey.65
These numbers may seem small compared to, say, the 187 million acres
of the National Forest System,' until one realizes that this is all land some-
one felt was worth protecting from development and made the effort to pro-
tect. Therefore, unlike the National Forests, National Parks, and National
Wildlife Refuges, it includes little or no land above 9,000 feet, north of the
60th parallel, under glaciers or rock slides, or with slopes that cannot be nego-
tiated without ropes. Private land trusts also tend to be concentrated in the
more populous parts of the country: New England (36%), the Mid-Atlantic
region (18%), and the West Coast (16%).' Most significantly, the rapid
growth of land trusts suggests that the acreage of protected land will multiply
in years to come.
III. A "PRIVATE" TRANSACTION
The mixture of public and private in a land trust conservation easement
transaction stands out more clearly when presented in a factual context. While
I could make the points below using a variety of specific transactions which
have taken place in Colorado in recent years, it is simpler to use a hypotheti-
cal transaction that draws together the elements of many transactions in a sim-
plified form.
A. The First Generation
Laura Deadlock wakes up one morning and realizes that she is not as
young as she used to be. Seventy years of raising cattle on the Deadlock ranch
and fighting with the federal government about public land grazing have taken
their toll. She loves her family and hopes they will stay in the ranching busi-
ness. She loves her Colorado mountain ranch and the idea of seeing it carpeted
with condominiums fills her with dismay. She owns a thousand acres, worth
$1 million' in a real estate market inflated by developers and perhaps half
64. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vi.
65. Id.
66. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST
SYSTEM 1 (1996).
67. Id.
68. This figure is probably unrealistically low. Telephone Interview with William Silberstein,
Isaacson, Rosenbaum & Levy, P.C. (June 27, 1996).
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that much ($500,000) as a going concern. On a clear night, and there are
many, she can see the lights of the nearby ski area.
Laura has an honest son, Martin, who works at a university a few hours
drive away. She would be happy to leave him the ranch and he would be
happy to have it. However, Laura is aware of the federal estate tax and knows
that if she leaves Martin the ranch in her will there may be more estate tax to
pay than he can afford on his university salary. Federal estate tax applies to
estates valued at $600,000 or more.69 Effective rates start at 37% and escalate
quickly. 7 ' Assuming Laura had no other property, her estate would incur
roughly $153,000 in tax payable within nine months of her death.7 1 Martin's
only option would be to sell at least a part of the ranch in a market dominated
by ski condominium developers.72
In a recent issue of High Country News," Laura read an article about
ranchers in another part of the state "preserving" their ranch land by granting
conservation easements to public interest land trusts. 74 She understood from
the article that granting such an "easement" might technically reduce the value
of the land, thereby limiting or eliminating the estate tax burden. Laura calls
someone she knows in town who puts her in touch with the president of the
Local Area Land Trust. A few days later the land trust president drives out
and gives Laura the good news.
First, if she grants the land trust an easement the land will be preserved as
in the easement document. Any restrictions created in the easement document
will "run with the land"--bind future owners. Although not a traditional ease-
ment, the conservation easement does share the single most important charac-
teristic of all common law servitudes-it burdens future holders of the "servi-
ent estate." If Laura wishes, the easement can be "perpetual," protecting the
land forever.
Second, by donating the easement to the land trust Laura loses nothing
she values (just development rights) and gains a potentially large charitable tax
deduction. Section 170(h), mentioned above, permits an income tax deduction
for a "qualified conservation contribution" to a "qualified organization." The
qualified contribution can include a "qualified real property interest" if the
contribution is made for "conservation purposes."" A qualified real property
69. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2010 (1994).
70. I.R.C. § 2001(e) (1994).
71. Id. Although there is Colorado estate tax due also, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-23.5102
(1990), it would not increase the total estate tax burden because the Colorado payment would be
credited against the federal estate tax. I.R.C. § 2011 (1995).
72. I.R.C. § 2032 may permit "a special use valuation" of land like Laura's at its current use
value under some circumstances. The maximum permitted reduction is $750,000. It might argu-
ably apply in this case, but would not significantly affect other similar cases involving higher, but
still realistic, values.
73. Saving the Ranch, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995.
74. Hal Clifford, Can Private Conservation Stave Off Ski-Town Sprawl, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, 10.
75. Conservation purposes include: (1) "the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation
by, or the education of, the general public"; (2) "the protection of a relatively natural habitat of
fish, wildlife or plants, or similar ecosystem"; (3) "the preservation of certain open space (includ-
ing farmland and forest land)"; and (4) "the preservation of an historically important land area or
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interest can contain "a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may
be made of the real property. 76 Such restrictions include conservation ease-
ments. The value of the charitable deduction will be the "value" of the restric-
tion. The value of the restriction is generally the difference between the value
of the land unburdened by the restriction and its value subject to the restric-
tion."
In Laura's case, her land is worth $500,000 as a cattle ranch and $1 mil-
lion for development. If she grants away all development rights not associated
with maintaining her ranching operation, she can assert that she has reduced
the value of her land by one-half ($500,000). Under the federal tax code, she
may deduct the lesser of the value of the easement or 30% of her adjusted
gross income each year for a total of six years until the value of the gift is
depleted.78 Unless Laura has lots of income from other sources, she is unlike-
ly to be able to deduct the entire value of the donated easement, even over six
years. Nonetheless, if she meets all the requirements, the deduction is likely to
save her a great deal of money.
If Laura needs cash, the land trust may be able to find some and enter
into a "bargain sale" whereby Laura sells the easement to the trust at a price
below its "fair market value." She gets a charitable income tax deduction for
the difference between fair market value and the sale price, and some money.
The availability of money to purchase Laura's easement may not be a function
of the wealth of the land trust's backers but rather a function of the fact that a
government agency (federal, state, or local) may be a potential future
purchaser. Many land trusts engage in what they call "preacquisition"
-purchasing development rights from private parties and then turning them
over to the government for money."9 This enhances their financial prospects
and decreases the amount of time and money they must expend monitoring
and enforcing easements.
Laura's feelings about government may prevent her from entering into any
transaction through which a government entity will eventually get an interest
in her land."° Even so, she may still be the beneficiary of another form of
government market participation. State funding organizations-the State Board
of the Great Outdoors Colorado Trust Fund in Colorado--may directly provide
the Local Area Land Trust with funds to purchase an easement on the Dead-
a certified historic structure." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (as amended in 1994). Each of these
four purposes is discussed at greater length in § 1.170A-14(d).
76. The Internal Revenue Service regulations define "perpetual conservation restriction" as
"a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which may be made of real property-including, an
easement or other interest in real property .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2) (emphasis added).
77. Keifer, supra note 13, at 136.
78. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B), (D) (1995) and I.R.C. § 58 (1994) (if Laura dies before the end of
the six years, the deduction dies with her, but most of us are optimists about such things).
79. EvE ENDICOTr, LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 17-27
(1993).
80. Id. at 39-40 ("It should be said, however, that some landowners will never accept gov-
ernment ownership of their land.").
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lock Ranch. As of 1993, at least thirteen states had such direct funding mecha-
nisms in place."'
Third, by donating the easement, Laura effectively reduces the value of
her land, thereby sheltering her estate from federal estate tax and, perhaps,
local property tax. Colorado's conservation easement statute specifically pro-
vides:
Conservation easements in gross shall be subject to assessment,
taxation, or exemption from taxation in accordance with general laws
applicable to the assessment and taxation of interests in real
property.... Conservation easements in gross shall be assessed,
however, with due regard to the restricted uses to which the property
may be devoted.82
Fourth, the arrangement will be a private transaction between Laura and
the Local Area Land Trust: no "red tape" or government approval required.83
While the absence of the potential delay and expense often associated with
government participation is relatively obvious and objective, there are other
more subtle and subjective benefits associated with a private transaction.
Laura, as a rancher, familiar and unhappy with federal range control, may
place a premium on the absence of government from her preservation deal.
Having lived most of her life in the area, she may also place an additional
premium on the local nature of the transaction. Chances are good that the
Local Area Land Trust is a small organization concerned only with a small
area of the state and that its president is a volunteer. The 1994 Land Trust
Alliance survey reveals that approximately one-half of the 1,000 odd land
trusts in the United States have a budget of $10,000 a year or less, that 54%
of the nation's land trusts have no paid staff, and that 21% have a part-time
staff only.84
There is other news too. But it is probably not going to be bad news to
Laura. As discussed above, the easement must be created for specific purposes
81. Id. at 258-313.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-109 (1990). In Village of Ridgewood v. The Bolger
Found., 517 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the principle that a
taxpayer may reduce the value of her land and her property tax assessment by granting a conser-
vation easement to a conservation organization.
83. A few states do require approval of conservation easements by local governments or
government officials. Both Massachusetts and Nebraska require prior approval for any conserva-
tion easement. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 184, § 32 (1996); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-2,112(3) (1995). The
Nebraska approval requirement ensures the sanction of local planning commissions. The Lower
Platte South Natural Resources District (NRD), which has undergone the Nebraska approval pro-
cess on three occasions, has not encountered any problems with the approval process. Telephone
Conversation with Dan Schulz, Lower Platte South Natural Resources Director (Apr. 24, 1996).
This may be due to the fact that the properties on which the NRD holds conservation easements
are not near any developed land. In Montana, the intended holder must present the proposed con-
veyance to the local planning authority for review, but their comments are not binding, merely
advisory. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (1995). For land to be placed in the Save Illinois Topsoil
Program, the land must have a management plan approved by the soil and water conservation
district of the county in which the land is located. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 505, para. 35/1-3(f), 35/2-1
(1996). Oregon requires any public entity considering obtaining a conservation easement to hold a
public hearing. OR. REv. STAT. § 271.735 (1987).
84. DIRECTORY, supra note 3, at vii.
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or uses.85 Technically, Laura cannot create the easement just to preserve the
ranch for her son, Martin, or save herself taxes. However, because the side
effects of preserving the ranch for natural or agricultural purposes will be to
preserve the ranch for her son and save both income and estate taxes, she is
unlikely to complain. If Laura wants her charitable income tax deduction, she
must donate to either a government entity or qualified conservation organiza-
tion as discussed above. She assumes the Local Area Land Trust qualifies. If
she wants her deduction, she must grant the easement "in perpetuity."
Despite the constraints on the potential transaction, Laura has choices. She
may drop the idea, give up the ranch, find some other way of paying estate
tax, or find another tax shelter mechanism. She may give up the idea of the
charitable deduction and grant a less-than-perpetual easement. She may grant a
perpetual easement and get all the benefits. If she takes this third option, she
presides over the happy marriage of public goals, as expressed in the legisla-
tion, and her private desires.
B. What Governments Did
If Laura grants an easement to the Local Area Land Trust, she will do so
at her kitchen table or in the modest land trust office with no government
representative present. The transaction will have the trappings, and "magic," of
a private deal. Yet, governments have acted at three levels to make that deal
both possible and attractive.
First, the state legislature fashioned the novel, negative, in gross, conser-
vation easement-a real property right which Laura may grant-and
authorized the land trust to hold it. In doing so, it delegated a traditional
sovereign regulatory function to a private entity. The "negative easement in
gross" created by the Deadlock transaction means no more or less than a right
for the holder of the easement, private or public, to regulate activities on the
servient estate. The holder of the conservation easement operates as a
regulatory authority charged with enforcing the mandate set forth in the
conservation easement document, just as a public agency operates as an
authority charged with enforcing the mandate generated by the municipal
zoning code or state wildlife law.
Second, the federal tax code provides Laura with both positive and
negative incentives. Potential estate tax liability on the unburdened ranch
creates a financial incentive to do something to shelter its value before she
dies. The charitable income tax deduction provides motivation to convey
85. Laura lives in Colorado where the law only requires a "Conservation easement in gross"
to be:
appropriate to the retaining or maintaining ... land, water, or airspace, including im-
provements, predominantly in a natural, scenic, or open condition, or for wildlife habitat,
or for agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use or condition consistent
with the protection of open land having wholesome environmental quality or life-sustain-
ing ecological diversity, or appropriate to the conservation and preservation of buildings,
sites, or structures having historical, architectural, or cultural interest or value.
See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text; see infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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development rights in the form of a conservation easement. Potential local
property tax and state income tax savings sweeten the pot.
Third, governments-federal, state, and local-have acted as market
participants in the "open space" market. Their interest in open space
significantly increases Laura's chances of getting cash compensation for her
easement both by creating a secondary market in which the Local Area Land
Trust may resell her easement and by providing direct funding to private
entities to buy easements like Laura's. Government market participation also
influences the cash value of Laura's easement by supporting the novel notion
that the right to regulate someone else's land, nowhere near your own, has a
significant value and the not-much-older idea that open space has value.
All this government influence does not taint the private transaction with
the negatives associated with government. It does not destroy the private
magic. Why not? From Laura's point of view the answer is relatively simple.
While governments shape her motivations and offer her tools with which to
achieve her goals-with a few exceptions-they neither make decisions for
her nor do they review the decision she makes. The easement will be executed
and recorded as a normal "private" land transaction, unquestioned unless chal-
lenged in court. Laura (or her accountant) will calculate the tax benefits she
receives. While she may run a significant risk of an audit, the issues in the
audit will probably be limited to quantitative matters, like the value of the
easement conveyed. 6
IV. THE LONG RUN
Unfortunately, after Laura dies and the ranch passes down to the next
generation or the one after, perceptions of the nature of the transaction may
change. Although government influence will diminish, the nature of the
arrangement will seem more and more like the most despised aspect of
government: regulation. The fact that the original transaction vested regulatory
power in the Local Area Land Trust was unimportant to Laura because her
wishes and the requirements of the regulatory regime were identical. However,
as the ranch passes into other hands that regulatory power may take on much
greater significance. The congruity of public good and private desire may
disappear.
A. The Third Generation
Laura grants the easement to the Local Area Land Trust and leaves the
burdened possessory estate-the Deadlock Ranch-to her son, Martin. During
his tenure he respects her wishes as to the ranch's maintenance and, as a re-
sult, gets along well with the people from the Local Area Land Trust. Three
decades pass. Martin dies and his daughter, Nora, receives the ranch through
his will. By now, the potential economics of the ranch have changed. As a
86. See, e.g., McLennan v. United States, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Schwab v. Com-
missioner, No. 5297-90, 1994 WL 223175 (U.S. Tax Ct. May 25, 1994).
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result of continued declines in the price of beef, the ranch is still worth
$500,000 for the uses allowed by the easement. Ranching is now less common
in the area and a buyer who intends to ranch might be hard to find. However,
if the easement did not exist, the ranch would be worth $15 million for devel-
opment.
Nora is a moral person, but, like most of us, grew up in town. She has no
interest in ranching and barely remembers her grandmother Deadlock. She
cannot imagine any reasonable grandmother would have wanted to deprive her
of a life of cultural enrichment and leisure just to preserve a thousand acres of
scrubby ranchland. She goes to a lawyer and tells the lawyer that something
has gone terribly wrong. The lawyer tells her the bad news. The easement that
her grandmother granted to the Local Area Land Trust "runs with the land"
and binds all future owners, regardless of their feelings on the subject. The
restrictions are perpetual, and, therefore, neither Nora nor her heirs have any
hope of outlasting them. While Laura had choices, Nora apparently has none.
In Nora's eyes the easement is privatized regulation. The voluntariness of
the transaction, so important to her grandmother, is insignificant to Nora. The
private nature of the transaction is cold comfort. The people who run the
Local Area Land Trust, strangers to Nora, value "her" ranch as open space
and wildlife habitat and can summon the government's assistance in the form
of court action to ensure that Nora preserves the ranch for those purposes.
More than anything else, it is the "public" law, in the form of legislation and
courts, which separates Nora from her millions. The only quirk in the
otherwise common regulatory situation is that the job of regulating the Dead-
lock Ranch has been delegated to a private entity.
B. What Nora May Argue
At this point, Nora may decide, however unwillingly, to abide by her
grandmother's wishes. Or, she may decide to cast the dice, venturing a signif-
icant sum in litigation fees in an attempt to "break" the easement in the hope
of recouping a much greater sum by selling or developing the unburdened
ranch. Assume the die is cast, Nora returns to her lawyer and, suddenly, many
of the elements which made the original transaction such a happy marriage of
public and private now may aid in the frustration of the public goal.
1. Attacking the Holder
State conservation easement statutes require that a land trust be a "charita-
ble" organization committed to the preservation of land. Nora may assert that
the Local Area Land Trust is or was not. The Colorado statute and others like
it explicitly define "charitable" status in terms of the federal tax code. As
discussed above, the tax code requires that an organization pass a series of
tests to qualify as a "charitable organization.""7 Thirty years have passed. The
Local Area Land Trust has never had an adequate staff. Papers attesting to the
87. Supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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minimum requirements for charitable, non-profit organization status may be
hard to come by.
The fact that the Internal Revenue Service accepted the land trust as a
"qualified organization" at the time of the transaction creates a presumption as
to its status "as long as there are no substantial changes in its character, pur-
poses or methods of operation.""8 However, in referencing the federal tax
code in its conservation easement statute, Colorado and states like it, have
placed no time limits on the requirement. Further, reference to the federal tax
law in the Colorado statute gives Nora an opportunity to make her challenge
to this federally formulated status in a state court.
A tax-exempt charitable organization must be organized exclusively for
exempt purposes. 9 The presence of a single [nonexempt] ... purpose, if sub-
stantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or im-
portance of truly [exempt] ... purposes."' By asserting that the land trust
engages in significant non-charitable activities, Nora can attack the land trust's
charitable status and the capacity of the land trust to qualify as a holder of
conservation easements under state law.
A particularly troubling line of cases for land trusts hold that otherwise
charitable organizations, whose activities benefit for-profit organizations with
which they maintain a business relationship, are ineligible for tax-exempt
status.9 Land trust operations often involve arrangements with local for-profit
organizations and land trust preservation acquisitions can enrich private
holders of nearby land by guaranteeing their scenic vistas or open space
access.92 In McLennan v. United States,93 the Internal Revenue Service
challenged the tax-exempt status of the Western Pennsylvania Conservancy,
asserting that the land trust had forfeited that status by engaging in "private
inurement.' 94
Imagine, for example, that Nora files a subdivision plan with the
appropriate local authorities. The Local Area Land Trust gets wind of the plan
and, after getting no satisfaction from Nora, files an action in the Colorado
88. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 36.1 (6th ed. 1992).
89. The income tax regulations provide that "[aln organization will be regarded as 'operated
exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3)." Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c) (as amended in 1990).
90. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945), quoted in Tax. CL
Mem. Dec.
91. Housing Pioneers v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 2191 (1993) (holding ineligible
for 501(c)(3) status a charitable low income housing organization whose activities benefitted asso-
ciated commercial entities).
92. A number of parties challenging tax-exempt status in federal court have found their
claims barred on standing grounds. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Standing might be less of a problem
for parties challenging the tax-exempt status of a specific land trust holding a specific easement
that directly affected the plaintiff's financial status. This is particularly true when the removal of
tax-exempt status might directly prevent the organization under attack from enforcing that ease-
ment as a result of conditions imposed by state conservation easement law.
93. 23 Cl, Ct. 99, 103 (1991).
94. The United States Claims Court dismissed the claim on the ground that it was not
redressable by that court. McLennan, 23 Cl. Ct. at 103.
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District Court for the county in which the Deadlock Ranch is located, seeking
an injunction to prohibit the sale of any subdivision lot, arguing that the
conservation easement Laura signed prohibits subdivision. Nora's lawyer
answers the Land Trust's complaint by admitting the existence of the
prohibition against subdivision, but asserting that the Land Trust is not entitled
to enforce it because the Land Trust cannot be a conservation easement holder
under Colorado law. Nora's lawyer's papers paint a picture of the Local Area
Land Trust as a clique of local landowners who have manipulated the state
conservation easement statute and federal tax law for their own personal ends
and financial gain-private land use control to achieve private ends. As a
result, Nora's lawyer argues, the Land Trust is not a "charitable" organization.
In the face of this argument, the local district judge must decide whether or
not to enforce the terms of the easement as written thirty years before, terms
that reduce the value of the land Nora owns to a small part of its potential.
Many conservation easements provide the easement holder with the power
to transfer the easement to another charitable organization, a "back-up
grantee."'95 If Nora can establish, however, that the Local Area Land Trust is
not a valid easement holder, she can argue that it lacks the power to transfer
the easement to another.96
2. Attacking the Circumstances
The state statutes authorizing conservation easements require that they be
created in ways that further preservation. Nora may assert that the easement
under which she suffers was not. While we know that Laura Deadlock granted
the easement for a "conservation purpose," the incentive structure imposed by
federal tax law almost assures that she had other reasons to grant the
easement. If Nora asserts that the transaction was no more than a tax shelter
masquerading as preservation, she may question the validity of the property
right created by state law.97
In states like California, which have specific purpose requirements for the
existence of conservation easements," Nora may make arguments based on
motives now thirty years in the past. Laura's correspondence with Martin is
likely to contain more about the tax benefits of the easement than the beauty
and preservation-worthiness of the ranch they both knew well.
95. JANET DEIL. & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK:
MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS 111-16
(1988).
96. If the terms of the easement give the back-up grantee a perpetual option to take the
easement from the Local Area Land Trust or an executory interest transferring the easement to the
back-up grantee upon the failure of the Local Area Land Trust, the interest may violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities, common law or statutory. Although under the Uniform Statutory Rule, adopt-
ed in Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101 to -1107 (1990), the option could last only for
90 years.
97. Compare McLennan v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 99, 103 (1991) (rejecting an IRS attack
on a conservation easement transaction).
98. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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In states like Colorado, in which the restrictions need be "appropriate" for
the enumerated statutory purposes," Nora's arguments will be different but
equally dangerous. Thirty years will have brought unexpected changes. Nora
will argue that the easement is no longer "appropriate" for a conservation
purpose. Traditionally, the equitable doctrine of changed conditions allows a
court to alter or terminate a real covenant or equitable servitude when changed
conditions in or around the burdened land frustrate the original purpose of the
restriction." The doctrine of changed conditions is probably applicable to
conservation easements."° The combination of the doctrine of changed con-
ditions and the preservation-appropriate requirements in conservation easement
statutes may provide fertile ground for arguments to invalidate easements
when plaintiffs like Nora can convince a court that the easement no longer
serves a purpose the legislature contemplated.
Imagine, for example, that during Martin's ownership of the Deadlock
Ranch, the Hypothetical Power Authority condemned a right-of-way for a
high-tension power line across the ranch. 2 Assume the power line, hanging
eighty feet in the air from large steel poles, affects the scenic nature of the
ranch but does not prevent its operation as a ranch. Nora files her subdivision
plan. The Land Trust sues. Nora's lawyer can argue that the existence of the
power line frustrates Laura's original intent and renders the easement "inap-
propriate" for protection of the purposes set forth in the Colorado statute, and
thereby challenge the enforceability of the easement.
Statute-based arguments like those discussed above, if successful, would
likely result in the invalidation of the conservation easement. The limited,
novel, and statutory nature of conservation easements suggests that any pur-
ported conservation restriction that fails to meet the requirements of the state
statute that authorizes it is invalid, supported by neither legislative action nor
common law tradition. The prefatory note accompanying the 1995 pocket part
to the Uniform Conservation Easement Act states:
The Act enables durable restrictions and affirmative obligations to be
attached to real property to protect natural and historic resources.
The Act thus makes it possible for Owner to transfer a restriction
upon the use of Blackacre to Conservation, Inc., which will be en-
forceable by Conservation and its successors ...
99. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
100. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 4.10, 9.39 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
101. Jeffrey A. Blackie, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1989); Korngold, supra note 12, at 484-86.
102. Condemnation is a serious issue in the long-term preservation of conservation easements.
See Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan, 504 N.E.2d 1305 (IIl. App. Ct. 1987) (under
Illinois' Township Open Space Act, town lacked authority to condemn conservation easement on
qualified agricultural land); BRENDA LIND, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT STEWARDSHIP GUIDE
78-80 (1991).
103. UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT, comment to 1995 pocket part (emphasis added). The
lists of explicit immunizations from common law property doctrines common in authorization
statutes further highlight the statute-dependent nature of conservation easements. The Uniform law
provides seven:
A conservation easement is valid even though:
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In 1985, in Parkinson v. Board of Assessors,"° the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts struck down a conservation restriction covering three
tracts of land totaling 82.17 acres because, in the court's opinion, the restric-
tion was ambiguous about the extent of the grantors' reserved right to main-
tain a single family residence "with usual appurtenant outbuildings and struc-
tures." °t In the following year, in response to a motion for rehearing, the
court reversed itself, holding that the restriction met all the requirements of the
state's conservation restriction law."° Although a victory for the validity of
conservation easements and restrictions, the Parkinson case highlights the
statutory dependence of these novel conservation property rights.
3. The Statute of Limitations
Rather than force a court challenge of the Local Area Land Trust's right
to enforce the terms of the easement, Nora may simply violate its provisions
and hope the Local Area Land Trust takes no action until the statute of limita-
tions has run. Many states have extremely short statutes of limitations for
property or contractual claims. Arguably, the statute of limitations, for conser-
vation easement enforcement claims in Colorado is one year. 7
Assume the Local Area Land Trust has received two easements a year for
each year since Laura transferred her original easement. The land trust has at
least sixty easements to monitor. The overburdened land trust staff try to ade-
quately monitor each easement once a year as the Land Trust Alliance's Land
Trust Standards suggest,"°m but to do so they must monitor more than one
easement a week. If the Land Trust limits easement monitoring to the season
during which its inspector has a good chance of seeing the Deadlock Ranch
under less than six inches of snow, the available part of the year will shrink to
six months and the number of easements to be monitored per week multiply to
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder,
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at com-
mon law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the
burdened property or upon the holder,
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMErrr Acr § 4. A servitude that fails to satisfy the statutory definition of
"conservation easement" cannot benefit from these and similar statutory protections.
104. 481 N.E.2d 491 (Mass. 1985).
105. Parkinson, 481 N.E.2d at 492-93.
106. Parkinson v. Board of Assessors, 495 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. 1986).
107. Conservation easements typically contain building restrictions concerning real property.
Two Colorado cases have determined that set-back requirements are building restrictions concern-
ing real property. McDowell v. United States, 870 P.2d 656, 658 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Styers v.
Mara, 631 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). In Colorado, the statute of limitations for
actions involving "any building restriction concerning real property" is one year. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-41-119 (1990).
108. LIND, supra note 102, at 28.
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three or more. A single monitoring omission might foreclose any meaningful
remedy for a major violation of the easement restrictions.
Imagine, for example, in April of year 30 the Local Area Land Trust does
its annual inspection of the Deadlock Ranch. Nothing is amiss. In May of year
30, Nora starts construction of the Deadlock Spa and Resort. By the end of the
summer, the foundations of the garish buildings have been put in place, the
ranch roads have been paved, and miles of new plumbing installed. In April of
year 31 the land trust returns to do its inspection. To avoid trouble, Nora has
taken the opportunity to vacation elsewhere. Four inches of late snow hide the
ground level improvements. The Land Trust representative walks the property
boundaries and visually surveys the entire thousand-acre property in the fading
evening light, but fails to notice the new foundations and roads. In April of
year 32 the land trust returns again to find the completed resort. The land trust
calls its lawyers to take immediate action. Nora argues that the land trust
should have discovered the construction when it began almost two years be-
fore and the statute of limitations bars any enforcement action." 9
4. The Problem of Perpetuity
The perpetual nature of conservation easements makes them precarious.
The real property system favors alienability, relying on market transfer to
provide the highest and best use for land."' Under some circumstances,
courts have invalidated interests which effectively restrain alienability."'
Generally, courts' willingness to accept restrictions that limit alienability has
been inversely proportional to the duration of the restriction."2 Accordingly,
perpetual restrictions should be subject to a high level of scrutiny."'
When a property interest is held for preservation we are inclined to accept
preservation as the highest and best use of that property. When a property
interest is held for other purposes, however, and somehow restricted for pres-
109. This analysis does not change the "discovery rule" tolling statutes of limitations until the
plaintiff knew or should have known about the condition giving rise to her claim. Tolling applies
to violations of COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-41-119. The statute makes no reference to discovery and
its applicability may be an open question. See McDowell, 870 P.2d at 658. Whether or not the dis-
covery rule applies, the statute should run from the initial groundbreaking.
110. For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the conservation easement issue, see Dana &
Ramsey, supra note 12, at 2, 21-31.
111. Cast v. National Bank of Commerce, 183 N.W.2d 485 (Neb. 1971) (invalidating the con-
dition on a defeasible fee as a de facto restraint on alienability).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERvrruDES) § 3.4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter PROPERTY (SERvrruoEs)](addressing direct restraints on alienation) ("In determining
the injurious consequences likely to flow from enforcement of a restraint on alienation, the nature,
extent, and duration of the restraint are important considerations.... Another important factor is
the nature of the property interest and the type of land or development involved. Generally, great-
er restraints are justified on estates of lesser duration than on estates of longer duration .... ").
113. Dana and Ramsey point out that the common law is more inclined to accept long-term
restraints on alienation when those restraints are created on behalf of a charitable organization,
like a land trust, because we assume that a property right created in favor of a charitable organiza-
tion does the public some good and should not be struck down. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 12,
at 28-29. However, the inflexibility of a conservation easement once granted and the length of
time for which it may last, make a variety of attacks on this presumption of public good very easy
as, I hope, the rest of this section illustrates.
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ervation, the analysis becomes more complicated. The conservation ease-
ment-with its restrictions tailor-made to achieve the wishes of the original
landowner, the land trusts, and the government-has the potential to severely
restrict the alienability of the underlying possessory interest-Nora's interest
in the ranch. If, under the terms of the easement, the ranch can only be used
to raise cattle, then only cattle ranchers will buy it. If people stop raising cattle
in the mountains of Colorado, then no one will buy it. The specificity and
durability of the restrictions the easement imposes are among its greatest vir-
tues, but, from Nora's point of view, they may also provide a persuasive argu-
ment for invalidating it.
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)
draws a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" restraints on alien-
ation-subjecting the former sort to invalidation if they are "unreasonable"' 4
and the latter sort to invalidation only if they are without "rational justifica-
tion." '  Conservation restrictions are "indirect" restraints on alienation and
are therefore subject to the rational justification standard."6 This indi-
rect/direct distinction, however, is new in the Restatement Third 7 and the
reported cases still suggest that any restraint may be struck down if "unreason-
able."" 8
In his article, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis
in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, Professor Gerald
Korngold, no great fan of perpetual conservation servitudes, provides a variety
of doctrine- and policy-based arguments to challenge perpetual conservation
easements." 9 Korngold asserts that courts might imply a "reasonable dura-
tion" to terminate conservation easements. This approach allows a court to
impose "reasonable" limitations on land use restrictions when no express point
of termination exists.'20 Korngold also asserts that the relative hardship doc-
trine provides a basis for terminating conservation easements. The doctrine
gives a court authority to deny injunctive relief for violation of a covenant or
servitude if issuing the injunction would do more harm than it would
prevent.2' While application of this doctrine would not prevent land trusts
from collecting damages for violations of easements they held, damages would
not preserve the land and would be extremely difficult to prove.
Korngold fears that these doctrines will be inadequate to make land sub-
ject to conservation servitudes as alienable as he would like. Proponents of
preservation should scrutinize these doctrines, however, because they give
114. PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), supra note 112, § 3.4.
115. Id. § 3.5.
116. Id. § 3.5 cmt.
117. Id. § 3.5 reporter's note.
118. Turner v. Clutts, 565 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1990) (suggesting that restrictions that amount to a
prohibition of all use of the servient estate are void); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Kerr, No. I 1-
017, 1986 WL 7307 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (modifying restriction limiting use of site to
corporate headquarters on ground that it was unduly restrictive).
119. Korngold, supra note 12, at 480-95 (these include reasonable duration doctrine, changed
conditions doctrine, and relative hardship doctrine).
120. Id. at 479-80.
121. Id. at 486-89.
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courts the power to weigh the values protected by a conservation easement
against the value of the alienability of the land in which those values are em-
bodied. For example, in our hypothetical case, the district court judge might be
inclined to balance the $14.5 million the easement costs Nora against the
values (say, 980 acres of open space, 150 acres of elk winter range, five bea-
ver ponds and lodges, one golden eagle nest, etc.) protected by the Deadlock
conservation easement.
5. The Problem of Resources
The responsibility of enforcing the private regulation embodied in a con-
servation easement falls on the land trust rather than on the state. The land
trust may have a small fraction of the financial resources Nora is willing to
spend in litigation and much less incentive to protect a thirty-year-old transac-
tion than Nora has to achieve her personal enrichment. The treasury regula-
tions governing the tax deductibility of easement gifts provide little incentive
for funding enforcement of easements.'22 How can a land trust with an annu-
al budget of $10,000 a year and no paid staff members hope to defend its
rights created by a conservation easement from an attack by a landowner who
may have tens of millions of dollars to gain by developing the servient land?
The scales tilt even more when the land trust may find itself challenged by
more than one such landowner.
In contemplating these arguments, one must start by accepting that some
conservation easements certainly should be struck down. Humans' capacity to
predict the future is spotty at best and limitations on land use created in perpe-
tuity will inevitably generate problems. If, in fifty years, the Deadlock Ranch
is an urban waste surrounded by a mountain city of five million peo-
ple-absurd for ranching, unavailable as a park under the terms of the ease-
ment, a dump and breeding ground for all manner of urban ills, and loved
only by the open-space crazed principals of the anachronistic land trust-then
the easement should go. Once we accept this, the issue becomes how do we
tell the easements that really no longer serve a significant public purpose from
those for which someone is merely motivated to argue a lack of public pur-
pose for personal financial reasons. This sometimes difficult and often factual
sifting will be left to the courts. In many cases, the complex and financially
exhausting task of defense will fall on private land trusts.
In sum, the limitations that governments placed on Laura's original trans-
action-to shape it to further a public purpose-provide ammunition for her
granddaughter in her attempt to frustrate that public purpose. The private, local
nature of the transaction, so congenial to the first generation, now provides the
third generation with a relatively smaller and weaker adversary in her attempt
to overturn her grandmother's wishes.
122. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or
Compensation for Lost Expectations, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 349 (1995).
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V. CONCLUSION: FACING OUR PROBLEMS
As I noted earlier, these problems are not insurmountable. Solutions
abound, some traditionally private, others traditionally public. Indeed, the few
reported court cases involving the enforcement of conservation easements
suggest the willingness of courts to enforce conservation restrictions and
respect the policy behind them.'23 It is the contemplation of the potential
side-effects of these solutions that is, perhaps, most intriguing, and draws us
back to the New Private Law. What can be done to protect the public good
associated with transactions like Laura's from Nora's private desires without
destroying the "private magic" which allows the conservation easement
transaction to do more for the public good than traditional public regulation?
"Private" solutions seem the obvious place to start because they are least
likely to dissipate the private magic. Careful easement drafting, the inclusion
of attorneys' fee-shifting provisions (allowing prevailing easement holders to
recover their fees) in easement documents, and the careful creation and main-
tenance of extrinsic evidence of the intent of parties to the transaction will
help. Careful maintenance of land trust records and scrupulous observance of
the requirements of non-profit organization status are also important. For the
conciliatory, arbitration clauses concerning changed conditions will seem a
wise inclusion.'24 For the more bloody-minded, "poison-pill" arrangements
whereby the underlying possessory interest in the ranch is rendered defeasible
upon the frustration of the conservation purpose (to Laura Deadlock so long as
used as a ranch... ) may seem attractive. But will these be sufficient? They
may deprive Nora of many of her arguments, but they will not remove her
financial incentive, nor will they remove the insecurity of any perpetual land
use limitation.
The obvious "public" solution to the remaining problems is creation of a
government right, and duty, to third-party enforcement of easement condi-
tions. ' If state governments can enforce the terms of the easement against
123. Madden v. The Nature Conservancy, 823 F. Supp. 815 (D. Mont. 1992) (holding that a
conservation servitude could be created by reservation); Bennett v. Commissioner of Food &
Agriculture, 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991) (holding enforceable a conservation restriction on the
location of a dwelling even though the state conservation restriction statute did not specifically
reference dwelling location restrictions); Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (holding that construction of in-ground swimming pool was not improvement of
existing dwelling subject on property subject to conservation restriction).
124. LIND, supra note 102, at 59-61.
125. The Uniform Conservation Easement Statute takes a significant step in this direction by
including a "third-party right of enforcement" to be held by a party other than the easement
holder. The comment accompanying the statute states:
Recognition of a "third-party right of enforcement" enables the parties to structure into
the transaction a party that is not an easement "holder," but which, nonetheless, has the
right to enforce the terms of the easement .... But the possessor of the third-party
enforcement right must be a governmental body or a charitable corporation, association,
or trust. Thus, if Owner transfers a conservation easement on Blackacre to Conservation,
Inc., he could grant to Preservation, Inc., a charitable corporation, the right to enforce
the terms of the easement, even though Preservation was not the holder, and Preserva-
tion would be free of the common law impediments eliminated by the Act (Section 4).
Under this Act, however, Owner could not grant a similar right to Neighbor, a private
person.
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Nora or defend in any action she brings to break the easement, then the finan-
cial power of the state more than matches her multi-million dollar incentive.
Of greater value, the state may speak in court, for the people, about the public
value of the easement. But if we create such a public right, will future Laura
Deadlocks grant easements? Will they come to see the whole land trust move-
ment as a disguised public land grab? Will the private magic disappear?
As we wandered out of the auditorium into the misty California sunshine,
it occurred to me that the pile-clad activists around me-few of whom were
lawyers-had put their trust in the complex and sometimes contradictory bal-
ance of public and private law that undergirds the land trust movement. The
validity of the work they did and the future of the places they loved best de-
pended upon it. We lawyers may smile secretly at "private magic" and the
idea of legal limitations in perpetuity, but they take these ideas at face value
and sell them to landowners across the country. We owe them our best think-
ing and best efforts in preserving the balance and the magic.
UNIF. CONSERV. EASEMENT ACT § 3.5 cmt. (1981).
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